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Consular Officer's Amenability As Witness

C

Stephen J. Werber*

IMMUNITIES granted to members of the
diplomatic service, members of consular posts are given only limited
privileges and immunities. The existence and limitation of consular immunities arise by virtue of the office.' Thus the consular officer can be
called upon to testify in both civil and criminal matters under common
law, international law, and treaty provision. In the absence of a treaty,
consuls are generally exempt from giving testimony relating to matters
acquired within the scope of their official duties or as to material contained in the consular archives.2 This principle was succinctly stated in
a 1952 decision:
While a consular officer is not exempt from being called as a
witness he may not be required to testify concerning the contents of
the consular archives nor to divulge information, which has come
to him in his official capacity.'
The purpose of this paper is to examine various treaty provisions in
an effort to ascertain the manner in which a consular officer's obligation
to testify is set forth, the immunities given such officer and some of the
problems raised by both the obligation and the immunities.
ONTRARY TO THE EXTENSIVE

*Asst. Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University, College of Law.

[Author's Note: The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. Charles
Sabo of the Cleveland State Law Review Board of Editors for his able assistance
in the preparation of this article.]
1 1 Hyde, International Law, § 465 at 795 (1922); Sereni, Angelo, The Italian Conception of International Law at 335 (1943); Silva, "The Vienna Conference on Consular
Relations," 13 Intl. & Comp. L. Q. 1214 at 1224 (1964); Restatement (2d) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 81 (1965). Comment (a) to § 81 of the Restatement provides a short and accurate paragraph distinguishing diplomatic from consular function and immunities:
The extent of consular immunity has historically been much more uncertain than
that of diplomatic immunity. Although there is some overlap between diplomatic
and consular functions, diplomatic representatives are primarily concerned with
the conduct of foreign relations between states, whereas consular representatives
are primarily concerned with the interests of nationals of the sending state in the
receiving state, the sending state's relations with its own nationals in the receiving state, its relations with local authorities there and, generally, matters relating to the details of commercial intercourse and travel between the two states.
The broad personal immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents have not been found
necessary for the reasonably unhampered performance of such functions....
2 Lee, Consular Law and Practice, Ch. 17 at 263 (1961); U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Official Records, at 38, par. 34, U.S. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16 (1963);
Bishop, International Law, Ch. 6, at 599-600 (1962); Stewart, Consular Privilege
and Immunities, Ch. 5 (1926); Restatement, supra n. 1, § 81 comm. (c); 4 Hackworth, International Law, § 437 at 753 et seq. (1962).
3 American League for Free Palestine, Inc. v. Tyre Shipping Co., 202 Misc. 831 (N.Y.
Co. 1952). Here a member of the Israeli consulate in New York appeared in supplementary proceedings pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum and refused to answer
certain questions claiming that they concerned matters relating to his official capacity. Objection to the questions were sustained.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971

1

20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (2)

May 1971

Treaties Have Consistently Treated the Question of a Consular Officer's
Liability to Give Evidence in Judicial Proceedings
Should a consular officer be compelled to give testimony in matters
wherein he is neither plaintiff nor defendant? These problems have traditionally been resolved by treaty provision. Treaty interpretation raises
numerous questions including the following:
1 What is the distinction between civil and criminal matters;
2 Should coercive methods be permitted to compel consular officers
to appear and to testify;
3 Where shall the testimony be given;
4 Who shall determine whether the material sought is privileged,
and other subsidiary problems such as,
5 what protection should be given the dignity of the consulate;
6 Can consular immunity be waived?
The subsidiary problems are frequently resolved by relatively simple treaty provisions such as Articles 40 and 45 of the Vienna Conven4
tion on Consular Relations.
Various approaches to the other questions are illustrated by treaty
provisions and the discussions which took place at the United Nations
4
Conference on Consular Relations at Vienna in early 1963.
Without exception, the treaties studied permit a consular officer to
give testimony at his residence or at the consular post. Frequently this
statement is qualified by requiring that the testimony will be allowed
only where possible or permissible. Every treaty, except the Havanah
Convention, specifically provides that steps shall be taken to prevent
interference with consular functions. The Havanah Convention implies
such a provision by way of an article concerning preservation and by its
consideration of the dignity of the consular office. 5
Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Matters
With the exception of bilateral treaties such as the Harvard Draft,
and the Havanah Convention, none of the treaties studied made any distinction between civil and criminal matters. This may reflect that some
nations have a greater unity in their approach to civil and criminal matters than that found in the common law systems. Another factor may be
the possibly unique constitutional problem faced by the United States
regarding the Sixth Amendment.6
In at least five bilateral treaties involving the United States, there is
a clear distinction between civil and criminal matters. 7 A similar distinc4 U. N. Doc., A/CONF., 25/16/add. 1 (1959).
5 U. S. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16 (1959).
6 Art.
7

15, Pan American Convention on Consular Relations, 47 Stat. 1976 (1928).
U. S. CONST., Amend. 6.
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tion is found in Article 15 of the Havanah Convention. It should be
noted that these treaties were signed in the period of 1881-1942. More
recent bilateral treaties entered into by the United States, during the
period 1950-1964, do not make the distinction.8 Furthermore, the Vienna
Convention does not make any distinction between civil and criminal
matters. This may be one reason why the United States has refused to
ratify this treaty while many other nations have ratified it. Some of the
comments made by delegates to the Vienna Conference support the writer's position regarding ratification. 9
Research has failed to disclose any case law which would lead the
United States government to change previously existing treaty policy.
Nevertheless, the change has occurred to some extent and the government now enters into treaties which do not distinguish between civil
and criminal matters. There may be several reasons for the change. The
majority of nations are not in accord with the old United States position
and may simply refuse to accept it in written form. Another possible
reason may be the fact that other super powers exist in today's world
and their influence cannot be underestimated. Finally, the United States
has been included in treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union, whose
influence demands compromise if relations are to improve. American
State Department policy may reflect any or all of these factors or other
factors.
An example of the language which makes the distinction is found in
Article 2, paragraphs (2) and (3), of the Convention between the
United States and Mexico which was ratified in 1943.10
2 .... In criminal cases the attendance at court by a consular officer
as a witness may be demanded by the plaintiff. * * * The demand
shall be made with all possible regard for the consular dignity and
the duties of the office; * * *
3 .... In civil, contentious-administrative and labor cases, consular
officers shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of * * *
s Consular Convention between the United States of America and the United Mex-

ican States, Art. 2, 57 Stat. 800 (1945); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States of America and The Republic of Finland,
Art. 20, 49 Stat. 2659 (1934); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights
between the United States and the Republic of Austria, Art. 14, 47 Stat. 1876 (1928);
Consular Convention between the Republic of Cuba and the United States of America, Art. 5 (1926), as cited in Supplement to the Volume on Laws and Regulations
Regarding Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities, United Nations
(1963), hereinafter referred to as Supplement; Consular Convention between the
United States of America and Romania, Art. 4 (1881), Supplement.
9 Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 1304 (1964); Consular Convention
between the United States of America and Japan, Art. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 5602 (1962);
The U.S.-UK. Consular Convention, Art. 11 (1959), as cited in Lee, supra n. 2; Consular Convention between the United States of America and Ireland, Art. 11 (1950),
Supplement.
10 Supra n. 5.
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When the testimony of a consular officer * * * of the State which
appoints him and is taken in civil cases, it shall be taken orally or
in writing at his residence or office and with due regard for his
convenience * * *

This can be compared to Article 20, paragraph (1) of the recent Convention between the United States and the Soviet Union which provides:
1. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment,
on the invitation of a court of the receiving state, shall appear in
court for witness testimony.
The United States-Soviet Union provision states that consular officers shall appear as witnesses in court, but that no attempt to compel
their testimony is permissible. Furthermore, the officer can give testimony at his residence or at the consular premises, for any number of
reasons, rather than appear in court. There is little doubt that the officer
will testify only when and where he wishes. One wonders whether such
provisions are not going beyond the practical approach to consular immunity and becoming strikingly similar to diplomatic immunity.
The United States-Soviet Union provision contrasts greatly with the
United States-Mexico provision. There is some similarity in civil matters
but even here the duty to testify in court contained in the Convention
with Mexico is couched in far more obligatory language. The major
difference between the two provisions consists of the complete separation between civil and criminal matters. In criminal matters the appearance of the consular officer can be demanded, not simply requested, by
an interested party and the officer shall comply with the demand, according to provisions of the Convention with Mexico. The only qualification
is that the demand shall be made with due regard to consular dignity
and the duties of the office. Although there may be no substantial enforcement methods from a practical standpoint, the Convention with
Mexico leaves no doubt that in criminal matters the consular officer is
compelled to testify in court without the necessity of receiving orders
and instructions through diplomatic channels.
This entire question came under close scrutiny when the Harvard
Draft was prepared. Article 22 of the Draft makes the distinction and
reads as follows:
A receiving state shall exempt a consul from attendance as a witness
at the trial of a civil case; it may require the consul to give testimony orally or in writing at his residence or office and to attend as
a witness at the trial of a criminal case, but such requirements shall
be enforced with due regard for the dignity of the consul and his
convenience in the exercise of his functions.
In the opinion of its authors the Harvard Draft exempts a consul
from attendance as a witness in civil cases and assures that consideration
will be given for his dignity and convenience in his attendance as a
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss2/11
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witness in criminal trials. No general exemption is set forth which
would prevent the consul from giving testimony. The only limitation
contained in the Harvard Draft is found in Article 29 regarding archives
and official information. This is in accord, say the authors, with international law. Finally, the authors contend that the proposed article is
supported by many recent [sic., 1932] treaties and lists several such
treaties. It is accurately pointed out that such a distinction arose from
difficulties met by the United States in connection with the Dillon case."
This case will be treated in more detail when the question of compulsory
attendance of witnesses is discussed.
In the writer's opinion it would be theoretically best to require consular officers to testify in all matters, civil and criminal, whenever the
court believed their testimony would be material. The recognized immunity regarding archives and official acts should be maintained. The
pressures of time and the possible interference with consular functions
make it improper to require consuls to give in court testimony in connection with civil matters. This is somewhat upsetting as the reading of
a deposition into evidence compares very unfavorably with live testimony. The obligation placed upon the consular officer should be greater
than that contained in either Article 20 of the United States-Soviet
Union Convention, Article 44 of the Vienna Convention or similar treaty
provisions and should be more in accord with Article 22 of the Harvard
Draft, Article 2(3) of the United States Convention with Mexico and
similar provisions. A greater obligation is not meant to imply a mandatory obligation.
In regard to criminal matters the better position appears to be that
of the United States and a minority position, viz., a requirement that
consular officers should be compelled to provide testimony in all criminal
matters. A possible qualification would be to make such an appearance
mandatory when needed as part of the defense and discretionary when
sought by the prosecution. Such a distinction would be without adequate
value as it is as important to society to convict the guilty as to protect
the innocent.
As pointed out by one of the American representatives to the Vienna
Conference, many nations have laws that permit criminal defendants to
call witnesses on their own behalf.12 This is an essential part of a criminal defense and its importance should not be minimized nor should the
privilege be jeopardized. The demeanor of a witness on the stand, his
tone of voice and very character can be judged by the jury and the
11 In re Dillon, 7 Fed. Cas. 710, See also, Draft Convention: "The Legal Position and
Functions of Consuls," Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, 25
A.J.I.L. 193 (Supp. Val., 1932).
12 U. N. Doe. A/CONF. 25/16, statement of Mr. Blankinship at 378, paragraph 10
(1963).
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court. This is not possible if the deposition is read into evidence. Though
primarily one can accept the weakness of utilizing a deposition in a civil
matter where only economic factors are at stake, one should not abide by
this method where incarceration is the issue. A consular officer should
be willing to testify in criminal matters in spite of any real or fancied
danger he foresees and without regard to any interference with his
function. Since such a willingness may too often be absent there should
be compulsory language in consular treaties.
All of the treaties studied permit, in either civil or criminal matters
or both, the consular officer to testify at his residence or the consular
post. This right raises questions concerning the admissibility of such
testimony. Although this problem may well arise in many nations, this
paper shall use as an example the federal rules of both civil and criminal
procedure. The treatment of the compulsory process issue in treaties
and case law will also be discussed.
Admissibility of Evidence
Provided there is ample opportunity for full cross-examination and
attendance by all parties in interest, there is no great problem in utilizing depositions or written interrogatories in civil matters. Deposing
witnesses is a common practice in most judicial proceedings in the
United States whether they be in federal or state courts.
The Deposition and Discovery section of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 13 is extremely liberal in permitting discovery. 4 Rule 26 (a)
provides that any party may take the deposition of any person. This rule
encompasses witnesses, whose attendance can be compelled by use of a
subpoena under Rule 45. Rule 26 (d) permits a party to use the deposition of a witness if (1) the witness is dead, (2) the witness is more
than 100 miles from the place of trial or outside the United States, (3)
the witness is unable to attend due to age, sickness or infirmity, (4) the
party offering the deposition has been unable to procure attendance of
the witness by subpoena or (5) under certain exceptional circumstances.
It is evident that Rule 26(d) could apply to a consular officer. The
consular officer can disregard a subpoena with impunity in many cases.
A consular officer may often be more than 100 miles from the place of
trial. In addition to the specific Federal Rules provisions it must be
noted that many treaties provide for noninterference with consular functions and this could be held to constitute the necessary exceptional circumstances.
Typical treaty provisions are found in the Vienna Convention, Article 44 (2), which states:
13 28 U.S.C. Rules 26-37.
14

Id.
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The authority requiring the evidence of a consular officer shall
avoid interference with the performance of his functions. It may,
when possible, take such evidence at his residence or at the consular
post or accept a statement from him in writing.
the United States-United Kingdom Convention which states in Article
11 (3):
A consular officer or employee may be required to give testimony
in either a civil or a criminal case, except as provided in paragraph
(4) of Article 10. The authorities and court requiring his testimony
shall take all reasonable steps to avoid interference with the performance of his official duties. The court requiring the testimony of
a consular officer shall, wherever possible or permissible, arrange
for the taking of such testimony, orally or in writing, at his residence or office.
and Article 20 (3) of the Treaty between the United States and Finland
which states:
Consular officers shall be subject to the jurisdictions of the courts in
the state which receives them in civil cases, subject to the proviso,
however, that when the officer is a national of the state which appoints him and is engaged in no private occupation for gain, his
testimony shall be taken orally or in writing at his residence or
office and with due regard for his convenience. The officer should,
however, voluntarily give his testimony at the trial whenever it is
possible to do so without serious interference with his official duties.
Note also that Rule 31 permits depositions of witnesses to be taken
upon written interrogatories. Thus treaty provisions which permit the
taking of testimony outside of the trial are fully in accord with the rules
of evidence and such testimony would be admissible if the "use" provisions are followed. Of course, the testimony must also be proper under
other rules of evidence or it will be subject to the same objections as
evidence solicited at trial.
As do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure permit the use of depositions and written interrogatories in certain circumstances.1 5 However, the utilization of depositions
and interrogatories is more limited in criminal proceedings than it is in
civil proceedings.
Rule 15 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that if a prospective witness may be unable to attend or is prevented
from attending a trial and his testimony is material as well as necessary
to prevent a failure of justice, the Court may, upon motion of the defendant, order that the deposition of the witness be taken and that any
books, documents, etc., which are not privileged must be produced at the
same time and place as the deposition.
15 18 U.S.C. Rule 15.
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A major difference between civil and criminal proceedings is that in
a criminal proceeding only the defendant can utilize the deposition
process.' Under such rules a defendant would not be greatly prejudiced
if a consular officer refused to testify in court because the defendant
could obtain the benefit of his testimony by deposition. Either party
might be prejudiced to some extent by the physical absence of the witness. The rule thus provides not only a safeguard to the defendant but
offers compliance with constitutional demands of the Sixth Amendment.
The consular officer is also protected as the court will not permit the
deposition to be taken until the defendant convinces the court that the
information sought will be material.
Rules 15 (e) and 15 (f) govern the use of depositions and proper
objections to admissibility of such testimony. Rule 15 (e) provides that
a part or all of a deposition is admissible, though still subject to the
rules of evidence, where a witness is dead, out of the U. S., infirm or ill,
or where the party, offering the deposition cannot subpoena the witness.
The deposition can be used to impeach the testimony of the deponent
as a witness and any party may require all testimony where only part
of the deposition has been offered. It is not admissible if the party offering the deposition has procured the absence of the witness. 15 (f) provides that all objections to admissibility in evidence of the deposition are
made as in civil actions.
In practice it seems that a consular officer would most prefer to
testify by answering written interrogatories. Such a practice would
substantially lessen the amount of time expended by the officer and permit a thorough analysis of the questions before a formal reply is made.
Another important consideration is that the officer will have an opportunity to have the materials reviewed by either his post's legal advisor
or his personal attorney. The advantages in the use of written interrogatories, insofar as the consular officer is concerned, are substantial. His
position may well demand this procedure. On the other hand, adversary
counsel may frown upon this approach as it enables the witness to carefully consider and phrase his answers. The adversary much prefers an
oral deposition and will do all in his power to obtain it.
As indicated above, rules of procedure such as these are in accord
with the provisions of virtually every treaty studied. Even in systems
totally outside the American framework, such a procedure is permitted.
This view is supported by Article 12 of the Sino-Soviet Consular Agreement which provides:
Although there is no constitutional prohibition against permitting the government
to utilize the deposition process and some 22 states do permit this, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in 1966, rejected an amendment to Rule 15 that would have permitted this.
See, 34 F.R.D. 420 (1969); Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules (L.
Co-op., 1966), § 15.10 (1966). The apparent ambiguity of Rule (15) b which refers to
"parties" is resolved against the Government.
16
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Consuls shall be required to attend as witnesses before the judicial
organs of the receiving country in proceedings not connected with
their official duties. Where a consul is prevented by the exigencies
of his service or by illness from attending as a witness before a
judicial organ, he may make a deposition at his office or residence,
or may send a deposition in writing.
Whenever court rules permit, the consular officer will be able to
testify outside of the courtroom. 17 In civil matters there is, at best,
ameliatory language such as that contained in Article 2 (3) of the United
States-Mexico Convention. 8 In both civil and criminal matters, the consular officer is in a position to argue that under treaty provisions regarding noninterference with his functions and the dignity of his office, his
testimony should be taken at his residence or his consular post.
May Consular Officers Be Compelled to Testify
The use of a subpoena ad testimonium or duces tecum with a penalty provision is virtually impossible even if not specifically prohibited
by treaty provision. Traditional concepts of international practice have
strongly mitigated the use of such a device. Therefore, the only effective
way to compel a consular officer to testify is by obtaining a waiver of
immunity, threatening the withdrawal of the officer's exequatur, or
other diplomatic pressures. Other than through diplomatic channels
there is no way to compel a consular officer to testify, regardless of
treaty obligations. This is, of course, a problem common to many aspects
of public international law. 19
Compulsory attendance of a consular officer as a witness is a problem common to all nations. In the United States it is further complicated
by the mandate of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. 20
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence. [Emphasis added.]
Examples of the problems encountered could be listed extensively, a few
should serve to illustrate the dilemma.
The problem is, perhaps, more complicated than indicated above. See, Lee, supra
n. 2, at 262-263. See also: Lipscomb v. Groves, 187 F. 2d 40 (3rd Cir. 1951) which is
concerned with the admissibility of answers to written interrogatories where answers
to cross-interrogatories were not served in accordance with court rules. The interrogatories were not addressed to a consular officer.
18 Consular Convention between the U.S. of America and the United Mexican States,
supra n. 8.
19 1 Hyde, supra n. 1, at 807.
17

20

Supra n. 7.
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In April, 1924, the Polish Consul General had been subpoenaed to
appear in the New York Supreme Court to produce certain documents.
The subpoena was withdrawn by the court when the court was advised
that its issuance was in violation of international law. Subsequently the
Polish Legation wrote to the United States Department of State and requested that the Department indicate its concurrence with "the custom
accepted by international law of exempting consuls from the obligation
to appear as witnesses," and asked that this doctrine be applied to Polish
officers. The Department of State refused and said in reply:
A consular officer is not, in the absence of applicable treaty provision, believed to be exempt from the giving of testimony with
respect to matters not pertaining to his official consular business.
The Department of State agreed that international law did extend those
privileges and immunities necessary to discharge duties of the office and
21
indicated that the consular archives were inviolable.
In December, 1935, a consular officer in Canada informed the Department of State that a clerk in the consulate had been summoned to
appear and testify regarding conversations with a visa applicant. The
Legation at Ottawa was instructed to bring the matter to the attention
of the appropriate authorities. The purpose was to have the court advised of the immunity of consular personnel in regard to the giving of
testimony based upon knowledge obtained in the performance of official
22
functions. The result was that the clerk was excused from testifying.
The United States practice in this area is noted for its reluctance to
permit consuls to testify before foreign courts without prior authoriza23
tion from the Department of State.
Case law also illustrates the practical problems. In Samad v. The
Etivabank2 4 a Pakistani citizen brought suit against a British flag vessel,
its owner and operator for injuries sustained on board while the vessel
was in the Port of Norfolk. Respondents served a subpoena upon the
British Consul and Vice-Consul. The Consul, Mr. Cook, was present in
the courtroom but when called refused to be recognized. The court then
ordered Mr. Cook into the custody of a United States Marshal. A conference ensued, and the court examined the contents of the 1951 United
States-United Kingdom Convention. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cook
agreed to be recognized. Mr. Cook duly appeared, but upon being called
he refused to answer questions relating to wages, visits to the hospital,
etc. A motion was made to hold Mr. Cook in contempt of court which
motion was denied. The court held that Mr. Cook, as a consul, was im21

4 Hackworth, supra n. 2 at 754.

22

Id. at 766.

Lee, supra n. 2, at 264 ff.
134 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Va. 1955). See also: United States v. Tarcanu, 10 F. Supp.
445 (S.D. N.Y. 1935).
23

24
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mune. The consul was obligated to testify in the interests of justice
only as long as his own interests were not prejudiced. However, only
the consul was permitted to make a determination of whether his interests would be prejudiced. 2 There is little doubt that the court was
frustrated with the decision it reached. Nevertheless, the decision seems
both logical and correct.
The United States constitutional question is exemplified by the leading decision in the Dillon case. 26 Here the defendant served a subpoena
duces tecum upon M. Dillon, the French Consul, requiring him to appear
in court and produce documents deemed material for the defense of a
criminal matter. M. Dillon refused to appear and relied upon his immunity as a consul. Upon defendant's motion, the court issued an attachment which resulted in M. Dillon's presence in court over his objections.
M. Dillon disavowed any disrespect to the court but contended that the
treaty with France made him immune from service of such process. The
court then released M. Dillon and heard argument in connection with
the treaty. The question posed was whether the treaty, which declared
that consuls should never be compelled to appear in court as witnesses,
was in conflict with the Sixth Amendment. The wording of the treaty
and the amendment appeared incompatible.2 7 The court resolved this
incompatibility by declaring that if the accused "enjoys rights equal to
those of the prosecution, and stands, with respect to witnesses, on the
same footing with the government, it would seem that the object of the
constitution is accomplished." 28
It appears that the court was faced with a diplomatic and political
crisis which forced a change in its position. The tortured reasoning of
the court seems to result in a position contrary to the wording of the
Sixth Amendment. This conflict may account for the fact that the constitutional ruling was not the basis for the holding and was dicta. The
Samad v. The Etivebank, supra n. 26, at 544.
In re Dillon, 7 Fed. Cas. 710, 7 Sawy. 561 (N.D. Cal. 1854). This case is discussed
by many commentators including Hyde, supra n. 1, at 808-809 and Stewart, supra n.
2, at 142 et seq. Stewart notes that the United States was finally required to issue
a formal expression of regret and salute a French merchant vessel.
27 Id. at 711. The question then to be determined is: is the treaty stipulation alluded
to irreconcilably in conflict with the constitutional provision cited? In approaching
the consideration of this question, it is impossible for the court not to be profoundly
impressed with a sense of its importance-not merely abstractly, but on account of
consequences its decision may involve. On the one hand, it is asked to deny the
accused a right claimed to be secured under the fundamental law of the land. On
the other, it is urged not merely to hold a law of congress void for unconstitutional25
26

ity-a duty at all times the most delicate and important an American court of justice
is called upon to perform-but to declare a solemn treaty stipulation, entered into
between the United States and a foreign country, to the faithful observance of which
the honor of the nation is pledged, inoperative and void, because those by whom it
was made had no power to enter into such engagements.
28 Id.
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actual holding was premised upon the defendant's failure to prove that
the materials sought were not official papers immune from process.
Having in mind the Dillon case, Secretary of State Mercy wrote to
the Minister of France on September 11, 1854, that "The Constitution is
to prevail over a treaty where the provisions of the one come in conflict
with the other. It would be difficult to find a reputable lawyer in this
country who would not yield a ready assent to this proposition." 29
At least one writer has stated that in criminal cases the attendance
of consuls, in court, as witnesses, is mandatory due to constitutional requirements. s0 In light of Dillon and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this position must be considered erroneous insofar as the prosecution is concerned and is apparently erroneous even as to defense
witnesses.
Treaty Provisions: The Question of Compulsory Process
The problems raised in the Dillon and Samad decisions are still not
settled. Treaties must be considered before any conclusions can be
drawn.31 None of the treaties reviewed specifically permits the issuance
of compulsory process, with penalty clauses, and six 32 contain prohibitions against such a procedure. The remaining treaties are silent on the
point but generally contain provisions guaranteeing the dignity of the
consular office and calling for noninterference with consular fuctions.
A somewhat unique provision prohibiting the use of penalty clauses
is found in the Convention entered into between El Salvador and Spain.
This Convention utilizes an entirely different approach to consular immunity and virtually removes consular officials from the court's jurisdiction. Article 4 states:
5 Moore, International Law 167 (1906).
Note, "Consular Immunity: In Law and In Fact," 47 Iowa L. Rev. 679 (1962). See
also, 2 Hyde § 476 at 1344.
31 Before turning to an analysis of treaty provisions and the positions taken at the
Vienna Conference a short digression is in order. Rule 17 of the Fed. Rules of Crim.
Pro. and Rules 26 and 45 of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Pro. should be noted. These rules
show that in both civil and criminal matters the clerk is empowered to issue a subpoena under the seal of the court. The subpoena power is broad and only the court
can prevent abuse thereof. Thus neither a subpoena duces tecum nor subpoena ad
testimonium will be upheld if the witness or information sought is not within the
proper scope of discovery or testimony. However, the court will not prevent the
issuance of a subpoena and will quash a subpoena only upon motion. Thus a party
can obtain and issue a subpoena in almost any matter.
32 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, U. S. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16, Art. 44(1)
(1959).
Convention between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Art. 20(1), supra n. 9;
Convention between the Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Art. 12 (1958) Supplement;
Convention between the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic, Art. 11(3) (1957) Supplement;
Convention between El Salvador and Spain, Art. 4 (1953), Supplement;
Consular Convention between the United Kingdom and France, Art. 16, Supplement.
29

30

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss2/11

12

CONSULAR OFFICER AS WITNESS

Career Consuls-General, Consuls and Vice-Consuls may not be
obliged to appear as witnesses before the courts of the receiving
state. When it is necessary to obtain a statement or information
from such officials, such authorities shall request it in writing or go
to the residence of the official in question to receive it personally.
More typical language is found in Article 20(1) of the Convention
entered into between the United States and the Soviet Union, Article
44(1) of the Vienna Convention; and Article 12(1) of the Convention
between Poland and the Soviet Union. The thrust of these Articles is
that members of a consular post may be called as witnesses. However,
if they fail to appear, no coercive action is available to the courts.
For example, Vienna Convention, Article 44 (1) states:
1 Members of a consular post may be called upon to attend as witnesses in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings. A
consular employee or a member of the service staff shall not, except
in the cases mentioned in paragraph 3 of this article, decline to give
evidence. If a consular officer shall decline3 to do so, no coercive
measure or penalty may be applied to him.

The arguments for and against a clause permitting compulsory attendance and testimony at trial were fully discussed at the Vienna Conference. At least two plenary meetings and three meetings of the Second
Committee considered, in whole or in part, the wording of Article 44 of
3 4
the Vienna Convention.
It is evident from various votes on proposed amendments, comments,
etc., that the Soviet Bloc was against inclusion of a compulsory process
clause whereas the United States favored such a provision. Perhaps for
political reasons several of the major arguments against such a clause
were made by the Norwegian representative, Mr. Amlie, while the
United States position was supported by motions to amend submitted
by Finland and Japan. Rather than center on adding language expressly
permitting compulsory process the debate was concerned with proposals
to omit that portion of Article 44 which reads,
or penalty may be applied * * *."

"...

no coercive measure

A substantial argument for compulsory attendance and testimony
was presented by Mr. Cameron of the United States. Mr. Cameron's
forceful argument centered on apparent injustices that might occur if a
consular officer refused to testify and pointed out that the first sentence
33 It is interesting to note the different positions referred to in each sentence of

Article 44(1). The draftsmen change from "Members of a consular post" to "consular employee or member of the service staff" to "consular officer." Just which
person is given which immunity thus presents a possible source of conflict.
34 Fifteenth plenary meeting, April 18, 1963; Sixteenth plenary meeting, April 19,
1963; Second Committee; Twenty-fifth meeting, March 21, 1963; twenty-sixth and
twenty-seventh meetings, March 22, 1963.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971

13

20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (2)

May 1971

of Article 44 (1) was rendered meaningless by the subsequent sentence
of Article 44 (1).35

Other arguments in support of the United States position were put
forth by its delegate to the Second committee, Mr. Blankinship. At the
twenty-sixth meeting of the committee he argued that:
1 There was never an intention to permit consular officers to enjoy
complete inviolability;
2 Failure of a consul to testify could result in a grave miscarriage
of justice;
3 The absence of compulsory attendance for consular officers would
establish a special category of persons who need not comply with
local procedure for the administration of justice;
4 The right of an accused to summon witnesses was a time honored principle of national law and the right was so important that
some nations would have to lodge reservations if the sentence remained. Such reservations would

"...

of course, defeat the desired

aim of a universal convention."
5 The fears expressed by opponents, based upon possible danger to
the person of the consular officer were unfounded.
6 The ends of the convention and justice would best be served by
requiring compulsory appearance. 36
One of the most intelligent arguments against deletion of the sentence was made by the Czech delegate to the Second Committee, Mr.
Spacil, who contended that it was necessary that a consul be the judge
of whether he should testify. Otherwise, the receiving state would be in
a position of final judge and that would be an "undesirable situation"
leading "to bad relations." 37
The argument of Mr. Spacil has considerable force. Coupled with
the points made by other delegates including Mr. Amile of Norway 38
there is much to be said for prohibiting the use of the subpoena power
and compulsory process in general. On the other hand, arguments in
favor of compulsory process are also valid.
In the opinion of this writer compulsory process should be permitted. If the personal safety of the consular officer is guaranteed to the best
ability of the receiving state and provision is made to prevent any abuse
of process, there is little good argument remaining against such a procedure. Realistically, the receiving state is obliged to protect consular
officers regardless of their amenability to suit or compulsory process.
Vienna Conference, Fifteenth plenary meeting, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16 at 57,
para. 75 and 77.
36 Vienna Conference, Second Committee, Twenty-sixth meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
25/16 at 377-378, para. 6-12. Similar arguments have been made by representatives
of other nations such as Mr. Percz Chiralogag Venezuela.
37 Vienna Conference, Second Committee, Twenty-fifth meeting at 377, para. 20.
38 Vienna Conference, Sixteenth Plenary meeting, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16 at 58,
para. 2.
35

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss2/11

14

CONSULAR OFFICER AS WITNESS

Court rules could most certainly be designed to prevent any potential
abuse of process. For example, the rules could provide that only a judge
could issue a subpoena to a consular officer and that this could be done
only after a contested motion or at least an ex parte motion. The purpose of the motion would be to determine, and for counsel to prove, that
the evidence sought is material and not privileged. Such a procedure
would prevent the issuance of subpoenas by attorneys for the parties,
a practice permitted in some jurisdictions.
Who Should Determine Whether the Material and Evidence Sought
Is Privileged
The problem of who should determine whether the material and
evidence sought is privileged was discussed in the Samad case 39 and by
Mr. Spacil. The court in Samad obviously felt that the final decision
must rest with the consular officer, but that this should be done only
after conference with the court and all attorneys. This view is in conflict
with that of Mr. Spacil.
Most of the treaties studied are silent or unclear in regard to the
problem.40 A few, especially those entered into by the United Kingdom,
clearly put the decision in the hands of the consular officer.41 The United
States-United Kingdom treaty is representative of several others entered
into by the United Kingdom. Article 10 (4) thereof states:
A consular officer . .. shall be entitled to refuse a request from the
courts .

.

. to produce any documents from his archives . . . or to

give evidence relating to matters within the scope of his official
duties. Such a request shall, however, be complied with in the
interests of justice if, in the judgment of the consular officer ....
it is possible to do so without prejudicing the interests of the sending
state.
The best solution seems to be one in which the ultimate decision is
made by the court. This is certainly impossible. An alternative, which
may serve to meet the demands of justice, would be a treaty provision
requiring attendance of the consular officer in judicial chambers. Thus,
a conference could take place, such as that envisioned by the court in
Samad, and the court could render an opinion. If this opinion is adverse
to the position of the consul, he could have a veto power and overrule
the court. If the decision is in favor of the consul's position, his adver39 Samad v. The Etivebank, supra n. 24.

For example: Article 20(4) of the Convention between the United States and the
Soviet Union simply states: "Consular officers * * * may refuse to give witness testimony on facts relating to their official capacity." Article 44(3) of the Vienna Convention declares: "Members of a consular post are under no obligation to give evidence concerning matters connected with the exercise of their functions nor to produce official correspondence * * *."
41 Consular Convention between the United Kingdom and France (1951), supra n.
32; The U.S.-U.K. Consular Convention (1951), supra n. 9.
40
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sary could be given the right to seek an advisory opinion from an appellate court. Furthermore, both the court and the attorney would now be
in a better position to seek a remedy through diplomatic channels.
Such a procedure would fully protect the dignity of the consular officer
and still permit disclosure of sufficient information to enable those concerned to reach an intelligent decision.
Conclusion
Treaties must attempt to balance, reconcile and compromise the
often conflicting philosophies, laws and interests of the sending and receiving states. No multilateral treaty, embracing divers nations and
legal systems, can adequately accomplish this goal. Traditional international law, although providing some guidance, also cannot resolve the
problems for all nations. Nevertheless, with all their faults bilateral and
multilateral treaties, including Article 44 of the Vienna Convention,
come significantly close to meeting the needs and demands of many
nations.
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